In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each spectrum usage request has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. After receiving bid requests from secondary users, and possibly reserve price from primary users, our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that will either optimize the social efficiency or optimize the revenue of the primary user. As computing an optimal conflict-free spectrum allocation is an NP-hard problem, in this work, we design near optimal spectrum allocation mechanisms separately based on the techniques: derandomized allocation from integer programming formulation, and its linear programming (LP) relaxation. We theoretically prove that 1) our derandomized allocation methods are monotone, thus, implying truthful auction mechanisms; 2) our derandomized allocation methods can achieve a social efficiency or a revenue that is at least 1 − 1 e times of the optimal respectively; Our extensive simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis.
INTRODUCTION
The growing demand for limited spectrum resource poses a great challenge in spectrum allocation and usage. One of the most promising methods is spectrum auction, which provides sufficient incentive for primary user (a.k.a seller) to sublease spectrum to secondary users (a.k.a buyers). The design of spectrum auction mech- * Yu-e Sun is the corresponding author.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. anisms are facing two major challenges. First, spectrum channels can be reused in spatial, temporal, and spectral domain if the buyers are conflict-free with each other, and thus, allocating the requests of buyers in channels optimally is often an NP-hard problem. Second, truthfulness is regarded as one of the most critical properties, however, it's difficult to ensure truthfulness in a spectrum auction mechanism with performance guarantee. Recent years, many mechanisms were proposed to address some of the auction challenges [1] [2] [3] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no truthful spectrum auction mechanism with performance guarantee, in which spectrums can be reused both in spatial and temporal domains.
Maximization of the social efficiency, i.e. allocating a channel to buyers who value it most, and maximization of the expected revenue, i.e. allocating a channel to buyers who pay it most, both are the natural goals for spectrum auctions. Thus, we design a framework for spectrum auction which can maximize the social efficiency or the expected revenue. Since channels can be reused in both spatial and temporal domain, the problem of allocating requests of buyers in channels optimally to maximize the social efficiency or the expected revenue is NP-hard. To tackle this challenge, we first relax the integer programming formulation of the channel allocation problem into a linear program (LP) problem, which is solvable in polynomial time. A fractional solution for channel allocation can be obtained by solving this LP optimally. Then, we transform this fractional solution into a feasible integer solution of the original channel allocation problem by using a carefully designed randomized rounding procedure that ensures the feasibility of the solution and good approximation to the objective functions. We prove that the expected weight of the feasible integer solution is at least 1 − 1/e times of the weight of the optimal solution. To complete our allocation mechanism, we also propose a derandomization algorithm to get a feasible solution whose weight is always guaranteed to be at least 1 − 1/e times of the weight of the optimal solution. Then, we propose a revised derandomization algorithm and prove that this new allocation method does satisfy the bid-monotone property, thus, implying a truthful mechanism. We point out that our allocation mechanisms can either approximate the social efficiency or the expected revenue, but not both simultaneously.
PRELIMINARIES
Auctions in our model are executed periodically. In each round, the primary user subleases the access right of m channels in the fixed areas during time interval [0, T ], and n buyers request the usage of channels in fixed time intervals and geographical location-s/areas. Our goal is to allocate these requests of buyers in channels, such that we maximize either the social efficiency or the expected revenue. We consider two models of the requests of buyers. The first one is the Point model, in which each buyer requests the usage of channels in a particular geographical location and during a fixed time interval. The second one is Area model, in which each buyer requests the usage of channels in a particular geographical area and also during a fixed time interval.
We use S to denote the set of channels, and define each channel sj ∈ S as sj = (Rj, Aj), where Aj is its license area, and Rj is the interference radius of a transmission when a user transmits in channel sj. Let B be the set of buyers, in which each buyer i ∈ B is assumed to have a request ri. Let R be the set of requests of buyers. Each request ri ∈ R is defined as ri = (Li, bi, vi, ai, ti, di), where Li is i's geographical location in Point model or the area where i wants to access the channel in the Area model, bi denotes its bidding price, vi stands for its true valuation, and ai, di, and ti denote the arrival time, deadline, and duration time (or time length), respectively. In this paper, we only consider the case of di − ai = ti, which means that the time request from the buyer is a fixed time interval. We leave the case of di − ai > ti as the future work.
We say that two requests ri and r k conflict with each other, if they satisfy the following constrains: (1) The distance between Li and L k is smaller than twice of the interference radius in the
and (2) The required time intervals from ri and r k overlap with each other. We denote the conflict relationships among requests by a conflict graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of requests of buyers, and edge (ri, r k ) ∈ E if requests ri and r k conflict with each other. Note that, for the same requests ri and r k , different interference radii of channels will lead to a different conflict relationship. We use a matrix Y = (y i,k,j )n×n×m to represent the conflict relationships in graph G, in which if requests ri and r k conflict with each other in channel sj, y i,k,j = 1; otherwise, y i,k,j = 0. Since the spectrum is a local resource, we also need to define a location matrix C = (ci,j)n×m to represent whether Li is in the license regions of channel sj. ci,j = 1 if Li is in the license regions of channel cj; otherwise, ci,j = 0. Therefore, two requests ri and r k can share channel sj only if y i,k,j = 0, and ci,j = 1, c k,j = 1.
The objective of our work is to design a mechanism satisfying truthfulness constraint, while maximizing the social efficiency or revenue. In our problem definition, an auction is said to be truthful if revealing true valuation is the dominant strategy for each bidder, regardless of other bidders' bids. An auction mechanism is truthful if its allocation algorithm is monotonic and it always charges critical values from its buyers [5] . The critical value for a buyer is the minimum bid value, with which the buyer will win the auction.
Social Efficiency Maximization: Social efficiency for an auction mechanism is defined as max ∑ r i ∈R vixi, where xi = 1 if buyer i wins in the auction; otherwise, xi = 0.
Revenue Maximization: The revenue of an auction is the total payment of buyers. An auction maximizing the revenue for the auctioneer is known as an optimal auction in economic theory [4] . In the optimal auction, Myerson introduces the notion of virtual valuation ϕi(bi) as
where Fi(bi) is the probability distribution function of true valuations of buyer i, and fi(bi) =
. According to the theory of optimal auction [4] , maximizing the expected revenue is equivalent to finding the optimal solution of max
A STRATEGYPROOF SPECTRUM AUC-TION FRAMEWORK
In this section, we propose a general truthful spectrum auction framework with the goal of maximizing social efficiency or revenue, as shown in Algorithm 1. In our framework, we can flexibly choose different optimization targets according to the practical requirements of auction problems. To ensure the worst case profit, the primary user will set a virtual reservation price η θ , which is the minimum virtual price for spectrums per unit time. Let {ξ}Ψ denote a set whose elements satisfy property Ψ. The details are depicted as follows.
Algorithm 1 Our truthful spectrum auction framework Input: conflict graph G, location matrix C, set of channels S, set of requests R, monotone allocation and payment mechanism A; Output: channel assignment X, payment P ; 1:
if the target is maximization of social efficiency then 4:
ϕi(bi) = bi; 5:
Run A using the set of virtual bids {ϕi(bi)} r i ∈R ′ ; 10: Let X = {xi} r i ∈R ′ be the channel allocation andP = {pi} r i ∈R ′ be the corresponding payment returned by A; 11: for each xi = 1 do 12:
if the target is maximization of social efficiency then 13: pi =pi; 14: else 15:
The Optimal Channel Allocation
In the channel allocation problem, we need to match the requests and channels optimally under their constraints. In order to simplify the matching model between requests and channels, we would like to segment the available time of each channel into many time slices. Recall that the available time of each channel is [0,T] in each auction period. Then, we use the arrival time ai and deadline di of each request ri to partition the time interval [0,T]. Each arrival time/deadline of requests divides the time axis of one channel into two parts. Suppose there are n requests, the time interval [0,T] is divided into no more than 2n + 1 time slices.
After the introduction of segmentation process, we give the detailed description of the channel allocation problem. First, for each partitioned time slice derived from channel sj, it can only be allocated to the requests within the license area of channel sj. Let x l j,i represent whether the l-th time slice of channel sj is allocated to the request ri, then we get a constraint x l j,i ≤ ci,j. Second, each time slice can only be allocated to requests conflict-free with each other. Thus, we get another constraint
be the length of l-th time slice in channel sj. Modify ai to be the first time slice ri wants to use, and di to be the last time slice ri wants to use. Moreover, if we allocate request ri in channel sj, the time assigned to request ri from channel sj should be equal to the required time of request ri, so we get
. From the analysis above, the allocation problem can be formulated as follows.
where xi,j stands for whether channel sj is allocated to request ri or not, y i,k,j represents whether request ri conflicts with request r k or not in channel sj.
(1-1/e)-Approximation methods
LP relaxation technique can be introduced to solve NP-hard problems, and it often leads to a good approximation algorithm. We release IP(1) to linear programming LP(2) by replacing xi,j ∈ {0, 1} with 0 ≤ xi,j ≤ 1, and replacing
Recall that the number of time slices is no more than 2n + 1 for each channel, so LP(2) has a polynomial number of variables and constraints, and can be solved optimally in polynomial time.
Randomized Rounding
Suppose OLP 2 is the optimal solution of LP (2), we apply a standard randomized rounding on it to obtain an integral feasible solution fIP 1 to IP (1) . The rounding procedure is presented as follows.
1. Randomly choose a channel sj, randomly choose a request ri with xi,j > 0, and set xi,j = 1; 2. If xi,j = 1, set x k,j = 0 for all requests r k with y i,k,j = 1; 3. If xi,j = 1, set x i,k = 0 for all channels with k ̸ = j. 4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 until all requests have been processed. Through the randomized rounding procedure above, the optimal solution of LP (2) is converted into a feasible solution of IP(1). Let wO LP 2 be the weight of OLP 2, and let E(w f IP 1 ) be the expected weight of fIP 1. We show in Theorem 1 that E(w f IP 1 ) ≥ (1 − 1/e)wO LP 2 .
THEOREM 1. The expected weight of the rounded solution is at least 1 − 1/e times of the weight of the optimal solution to LP (2).
PROOF. Due to the page limit, all the detailed proofs can be referred to [6] .
We have shown that the expected weight of feasible solution fIP 1 of IP (1) obtained by our randomized rounding is larger than 1−1/e times of the weight of the optimal solution of LP (2) . Obviously, the weight of the optimal solution of LP (2), which is denoted by wO LP 2 , is larger than the optimal solution of IP (1), which is denoted by wO IP 1 . Therefore, we can get that 
Deterministic Methods
The rounding procedure only makes sure that the expected weight of fIP 1 is larger than 1 − 1/e times of the weight of OLP 2. What we need is to find a feasible solution of IP(1) whose weight is exactly larger than 1 − 1/e times of the wO LP 2 . In the following, we show that the rounding procedure can be derandomized and how the method of conditional probabilities can be used in our setting.
Algorithm 2 DCA: Derandomized Channel Allocation Based on Linear Programming
Input: Conflict graph G, location matrix C, set of channels S, set R ′ sorted in increasing order according to ai; Output: channel assignment X * ; 1: Solve LP(2) optimally; 2:
3
if
set xi,j = 1, xi = 1; 8:
set all x i,k = 0 and x
set all x k,j = 0 and x l k,j = 0 if k ̸ = i and y i,k,j = 1; 10: Break 11:
Let E(w f IP 1 |ri → sj) be the expected weight when request ri is allocated in channel sj, and let E(w f IP 1 |ĩ) be the expected weight when request ri will not be allocated in any channel. Next, we will show how our derandomization algorithm works. We first sort all the requests by their arrival time ai in the ascending order. Let xi = ∑ j∈S xi,j, and then scan all the requests one by one to decide which request can be allocated in channels. When request ri is considered, we scan all of the channels that are available for ri to check if ri can be allocated in one of them. If E(w f IP 1 |ri → sj) < E(w f IP 1 ), set xi,j = 0; otherwise, allocate ri in channel sj, and set xi,j = 1, xi = 1,
Suppose ri is the first request that satisfies xi > 0 in the ordered requests. Let qi,j denote the probability that request ri is allocated in channel sj and let qĩ denote the probability that ri is not allocated in any channel. By the formula for conditional probabilities, we have
In particular, there exists at least one conditional expectation in
holds, reject request ri, and set xi,j = 0 for each sj ∈ S. This can be done since E(w f IP 1 ) = ∑ r i ∈R ′ ϕi(bi)qi, and qi can be computed precisely by
Let q r i →s j ,k stand for the probability that request r k is allocated in a channel when request ri is allocated in sj. Then q r i →s j ,k can be calculated by
For each request ri, we can compute E(w f IP 1 |ri → sj) precisely as the follows
Given the selections in the prior requests, we can continue deterministically to allocate other requests and do the same thing while maintaining the invariant that the conditional expectation E(w f IP 1 ), never deceases. After allocating all of the requests, we can get a feasible solution of IP(1) whose weight is as good as E(w f IP 1 ), i.e. at least (1 − 1/e)wO LP 2 .
Recall that to ensure the truthfulness of our auction mechanism, the allocation algorithm must be bid-monotone. However, we cannot prove or disprove the bid-monotone property of the allocation method DCA (presented in Algorithm 2). Thus, it is unknown whether we can design a truthful mechanism based on this method. In the rest of the section, we revise this method and show that the revised method does satisfy the bid-monotone property.
Since that there exists at least one of the conditional expectations between maxs j ∈S E(w f IP 1 |ri → sj) and E(w f IP 1 |ĩ), which is larger than E(w f IP 1 ). Thus, if we allocate ri in the channel with the maximal conditional expectation as long as
, and do not allocate ri in any channel otherwise, we can also get a feasible solution of IP(1), whose weight is as good as E(w f IP 1 ).
This can be done since we can compute E(w f IP 1 |i, j) and E(w f IP 1 |ĩ) precisely as follows:
where
is the expected weight of all other requests when request ri has been allocated in channel sj. We can get it by allocating ri in channel sj first, and then solve LP(2) optimally with other requests.
) is the expected weight of all other requests when request ri is not allocated in any channel. We can get it by solving LP(2) optimally with requests except ri.
Based on the observation above, we give a revised version (called MDCA) of Algorithm DCA as follows. In MDCA, we first sort all of the requests by their arrival times in the ascending order, and then we scan all requests one by one to decide which request can be allocated in channels. When request ri is considered, we compute E(w f IP 1 |ri → sj) for all channels sj ∈ S that no request conflicting with it has been allocated in. We allocate ri in channel s k when E(w f IP 1 |ri → s k ) = maxs j ∈S E(w f IP 1 |ri → sj) ≥ E(w f IP 1 |ĩ), and reject it otherwise. After the last request was considered in MDCA, we get a feasible solution of IP (1), whose weight is as good as E(w f IP 1 ).
THEOREM 3. MDCA (see Algorithm 3) is bid monotone.
Since the revised Algorithm MDCA is bid-monotone, there exists a critical value for each winner. Thus, we can design a truthful auction mechanism through charging each winner its critical value.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the case that spectrum can be reused spatial domain, temporal domain. We have designed a general truthful spectrum auction framework which can maximize the social efficiency or revenue. As allocating channels optimally is NP-hard in our model, we have also proposed a set of near-optimal channel allocation mechanisms with an approximation factor of (1 − 1/e).
